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FIVE FORKS.
By Brevet Major-General Joshua L. Chamberlain.

PRESENT some reminiscences of things which fell under
my observation on the first day of April, 1865, the day of
Five Forks. This paper is the outcome of notes made within
a few days of the occurrences, and written out soon after the
stress of that campaign was over, and while the images of its
experiences were vivid in the mind. It will be understood,
therefore, that this is a description of facts as they occurred and
appeared to me.
Since that was written, an unusual amount of light has been
cast, through various atmospheres, on the proceedings of that
day; first in official reports of prominent participants, then in
published brochures of actors, claimants or advocates, and espec
ially in the remarkable disclosures before the Court of Inquiry
called to investigate the conduct of General Warren.
It seems best not to disturb the singleness of the point of
view and simple unity of this sketch by incorporating corrobora
tive or qualifying material; but to let it stand for what it may
be worth in itself. I shall permit myself, however, to pay pass
ing notice,— as it were, in parenthesis,— to certain collateral
testimony or relevant remark of others, which may assist in set
ting facts in their true lines and light.1
Comparison and study of this later material give occasion for
the reminder that even official reports, made often under first
impressions,— from personal observation, indeed, but therein
limited or partial,— are quite liable to disturb the true balance
and perspective of the whole field of action. This liability is
greater as the individual impression or experience is stronger.

I

1 In printing this, these added collateral references are thrown into foot
notes, or into a separate discussion at the close.
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Such testimony is valuable as giving what was done, or seen at
particular points or believed at the time; and is to be weighed
by the credibility of the narrator, as to character, temperament,
or state of mind. It is only by gathering, sifting and compar
ing these that the truth in detail or in the whole can be
comprehended.
I present this paper, subject perhaps to the criticism I have
just indicated, as being mainly a contribution of the partial kind,
and standing on the general credibility of the narrator; but
claiming also as to certain specific conclusions to rise to the
more comprehensive view afforded by enlarged opportunities for
judgment.
The vicissitudes of that day, and the grave and whimsical
experiences out of which we emerged into it, exhibited the play
of that curious law of the universe seen in tides, reactions, or
reversals of polarities at certain points of tension or extremes of
pressure, and which appears also in the mixed relations of men
and things. There are pressure-points of experience at which
the unsupportably disagreeable becomes “a jolly good time.”
When you cannot move in the line of least resistance, you take
a very peculiar pleasure in crowding the point of greatest resist
ance. No doubt there is in the ultimate reasons of human
probation special place for that quality of manhood called perse
verance, patience, pluck, push, persistence, pertinacity,— or
whatever other name beginning with this “explosive mute,” —
the excess of which, exhibited by persons or things, is somewhat
profanely referred to as “ pure cussedness.”
After such a day and night as that of the thirty-first of
March, 1865, the morning of April 1 found the men of the Fifth
Corps strangely glad they were alive. They had experienced a
kaleidoscopic regeneration. They were ready for the next new
turn,— whether of Fortunatus or Torquemada. The tests of
ordinary probation had been passed. All the effects of “humil
iation, fasting and prayer,” believed to sink the body and exalt
the spirit, had been fully wrought in them. At the weird mid
night trumpet-call they rose from their sepulchral fields as those
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over whom death no longer has any power. Their pulling out
for the march in the ghostly mists of dawn looked like a passage
in the transmigration of souls — not sent back to work out the
remnant of their sins as animals, but lifted to the “ third plane”
by that three days of the under-world,— eliminating sense,—
incorporating soul.
The pleasantries associated with April 1 were not much put
in play : none of those men were going to be “ fooled ” that
day.
When we joined the cavalry, some of us were aware of a little
shadow cast between the two chief luminaries,— him of the cav
alry and him of the infantry ; but that by no means darkened
our disks. If not “hale fellows,” we were “well met.” The
two arms of the service embraced each other heartily, glad to
share fortunes. Particularly we ; for the cavalry had the habit
of being a little ahead, and so got all the chickens,— as we knew
by the kind of bones we found when we came after them. And
we thought the cavalry, though a little piqued at our not going
down and picking up what they had left at Dinwiddie the night
before, were quite willing we should share whatever they should
get to-day. Sheridan had also come to the opinion that infantry
was “a good thing to have around,”—however by some queer
break in the hierarchy of honor subordinated to the chevaliers,—
the biped to the quadruped, and by some freak of etymology
named infantry — the “speechless”—whether because they
couldn’t talk, or because they mustn’t tell. We were glad to be
united to Sheridan, too, after the broken engagements of the
day before, perhaps renewed reluctantly by him ; glad to fight
under him, instead of away from him, hoping that when he really
struck, the enemy would get hurt more than friends.
Griffin’s and Crawford’s Divisions were massed near the house
of J. Boisseau, on the road leading from Dinwiddie Court House
to Five Forks. Ayres was halted a mile back at the junction
of the Brooks Road, which he had reached by his roundabout,
forced march during the night. We were waiting for Sheridan,
at last. And he was waiting until the cavalry should complete
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one more “ reconnoissance,” to determine the enemy’s position
and disposition at Five Forks, three miles northward.
Although the trains which had got up were chiefly ammuni
tion wagons, a considerable halt was indicated and the men
seized the occasion to eat, to rest, to sleep,— exercises they had
not much indulged in for the last three days,— and to make their
toilets, which means to wring the water out of their few articles
of clothing, seriatim, and let the sun shine into the bottom of
their shoes ; and also,— those who could — to make their three
days’ vital equation of rations,— hard-tack, pork, coffee and
sugar,— concluding by stuffing their haversacks and pockets
with twenty rounds extra ammunition for dessert.
Meantime those of us who were likely to have some special
responsibilities during the approaching battle, had anxious
thoughts. We had drawn away from the doubly confused con
flict of yesterday; we were now fairly with Sheridan, cut off
from reach of other wills, absolved from the task of obeying
commands that made our action seem like truants driving
hoops,— resulting mostly in tripping up dignitaries, and having
a pretty hard time ourselves, without paternal consolations when
we got home. We knew there would be some fighting of no
common order now. General Griffin came and sat by me on
the bank-side and talked quite freely. He said Sheridan was
much disturbed at the operations of the day before, as Grant’s
language to him about this had been unwontedly severe,1 and
that all of us would have to help make up for that day’s damage.
He told me also that Grant had given Sheridan authority to
remove Warren from command of the corps, when he found
1 Griffin knew of the dispatch sent by Grant to Sheridan from the Butler
house on the Boydton Plank Road at about 2 P. M. of the thirty-first of March,
just as I was advancing, after Ayres’s repulse. This read : “Warren and
Miles’s Division are now advancing. I hope your cavalry is up, where it
will be of assistance. Let me know how matters stand now with the cavalry ;
where they are ; what their orders, etc. If it had been possible to have had
a division or two of them well up on the right hand road taken by Merritt
yesterday, they could have fallen on the enemy’s rear as they were pursuing
Ayres and Crawford.” * * * Records, Warren Court, p. 1313.

FIVE FORKS.

5

occasion, and that we should see lively times before the day was
over. We remarked how these things must affect Sheridan:
Grant’s censure of his failures the day before; the obligation to
win a decisive battle to-day ; and the power put in his hands to
remove Warren. We could not but sympathize with Sheridan
in his present perplexities, and, anxious for Warren, were resolved
to do our part to make things go right.
The troops had enjoyed about four hours of this unwonted
rest, when, the cavalry having completed its reconnoissance, we
were ordered forward. We turned off on a narrow road said to
lead pretty nearly to the left of the enemy’s defences at Five
Forks on the White Oak Road. Crawford led, followed by
Griffin and Ayres,— the natural order for prompt and free
movement.
The road had been much cut up by repeated
1 Much after-light is thrown on the elements of the situation by observing,
as we are now able to do in the published records of the war, the tenor of
the Hon. Charles A. Dana’s dispatches to the War Office of May 9 and
12, 1864, referring to Warren’s movements as slow and piece-meal, so as
to fail of the desired effect in the plans of the general commanding the army.
He accuses him of not handling his corps in a mass, and even implies a
positive disobedience of orders on his part in attacking with a division when
ordered by Grant to attack with his whole corps. (Serial No. 67, pp. 64,
68.)
Still the Fifth Corps “got in” enough to lose ten thousand six hundred
and eighty-six men in the first two fights. (Dana’s report, War Records,
Serial 64, p. 71.)
Even more light is turned on. For no dispatch of Dana’s concerning
Warren compares in severity with Dana’s to the Secretary of War, July 7,
1864, denouncing General Meade, and advising that he be removed from the
command of the army. (Serial No. 80, p. 35.)
It now appears that Warren was in great disfavor with Meade also, after
arriving before Petersburg. Meade called upon Warren to ask to be relieved
from command of his corps on the alternative that charges would be pre
ferred against him. (Dana’s dispatch, June 20, 1864, War Records, Serial
No. 80, p. 26.)
Meade was much displeased too with Warren for his characteristic remark
to the effect that no proper superior commanding officer was present at the
time of the Mine explosion, to take control of the whole affair.
And now, with Sheridan against him, poor Warren may well have wished
at least for David’s faculty of putting his grievances into song, with variations
on the theme : “Many bulls have compassed me about; yea, many strong
bulls of Bashan.”
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scurries of both the contending parties, and was even yet
obstructed by cavalry led horses, and other obstacles,— which it
would seem strange had not been got off the track during all
this halt. We who were trying to follow closely were brought
to frequent stand-still. This was vexatious; — our men being
hurried to their feet in heavy marching order, carrying on their
backs perhaps three days’ life for themselves and a pretty heavy
instalment of death for their antagonists, and now compelled
every few minutes to come to a huddled halt in the muddy road,
“ marking time ” and marking place also with deep discontent.
In about two hours we get up where Sheridan wants us, in
some open ground and thin woods near the Gravelly Run
Church, and form as we arrive, by brigades in column of regi
ments.
The men’s good nature seems a little ruffled on
account of their manner of marching, or being marched. They
have their own way of expressing their wonder why we could not
have taken a shorter road to this cavalry rendezvous, rather than
to be dragged around the two long sides of an acute-angled tri
angle to get to it,— why the two-legged and four-legged elements
of animal geometry had not been balanced by a better equation,—
in short, what magic relics there were about “J. Boisseau’s,”
that we should be obliged to make a painful pilgrimage there
before we were purified enough to finish dying at Five Forks.
It is now about four o’clock. Near the church is a group of
restless forms and grim visages, expressing their different tem
pers and temperaments in full tone. First of all, the chiefs :
Sheridan, dark and tense, walking up and down the earth, seek
ing,— well, we will say, some adequate vehicle or projectile of
expression at the prospect of the sun’s going down on nothing
but his wrath ; evidently having availed himself of some incidental
instrumentalities to this end, more or less explicit or expletive,—
for Warren is sitting there like an eagle brought to bay in
forced restraint,— all his moral energies compressed into the
nerve-centers somewhere behind his eyes, and masked by his
sallow, sunken cheeks; Griffin, alert and independent, sincere
to the core, at his ease, ready for anything,— for a dash at the
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enemy with battery front, or his best friend with a bit of satire
when his keen sense of the incongruous or pretentious is struck ;
Bartlett, with drawn face, like a Turkish cimetar, sharp, springy,
curved outward, damascened by various experience and various
emotion ; Crawford, a conscious gentleman, having the entree
at all headquarters, somewhat lofty of manner; not of the iron
fibre, nor spring of steel, but punctilious in a way, obeying
orders in a certain literal fashion that saved him the censure of
superiors; a pet of his State, and likewise, we thought, of
Meade and Warren, judging from the attention they always
gave him ; possibly not quite fairly estimated by his colleagues
as a military man,— but the ranking division commander of the
corps. Ayres comes up after a little, ahead of his troops, bluff
and gruff at questions about the lateness of his column ; twitch
ing his moustache in lieu of words, the sniff of his nostrils
smelling the battle not very much afar; sound of heart, solid of
force, all the manly and military qualities ready in reserve; —
the typical old soldier.
During this impatient waiting for the seemingly slow prepar
atory formation, our spiritual wheels were lubricated by the flow
of discussion and explanation about the plan of attack. Sheridan
took a saber or scabbard and described it graphically on the
light earth. The plan in general was for the cavalry to occupy
the enemy’s attention by a brisk demonstration along the right
front of their works, while the Fifth Corps should fall upon
their left and rear, by a sort of surprise if possible, and scoop
them out of their works along the White Oak Road, and capture
or disorganize them. The report of the cavalry reconnoissance,
as it came to us, was that the enemy had fortified this road for
nearly a mile westward, and about three-quarters of a mile east
ward from Five Forks, and at the extreme left made a return
northerly for perhaps one hundred and fifty yards, to cover that
flank. As I understood it, the formation and advance were to
be such that Ayres should strike the angle of the “ return,” and
Crawford and Griffin sweep around Ayres’s right, flanking their
“ return ” and enfilading their main line. This was perfectly
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clear, and struck us all as a splendid piece of tactics, cyclone
and Sheridan-like, promising that our success was to be quick
and certain. Our somewhat jaded faculties were roused to their
full force.
As Ayres’s troops were forming, officers of the other two divi
sions were taking their respective stations. I was in my place but
had not yet mounted, when General Fred Winthrop of Ayres’s
leading brigade came over and said : “ Dear old fellow, have you
managed to bring up anything to eat ? We moved so suddenly
I had to leave everything. I have had scarcely a mouthful
to-day.” I sent back an orderly and hurried up whatever we
had. The best was poor, and there was not much of it. We
sat there on a log, close behind the lines, and acted host and
guest, while he opened his heart to me as men sometimes will
quite differently from their common custom, under the shadow
of a forecasting presence. It was a homely scene and humblest
fare; but ever to be held in memory as the last supper of high
companionship, and vision of the higher. Half an hour after
wards, in the flame and whirl of battle, leading his brigade
like a demigod, as in a chariot of fire he was lifted to his
like.
The corps formation was : Ayres on the left, west of the
Church Road, the division in double brigade front in two lines,
and Winthrop with the First Brigade in reserve, in rear of his
center; Crawford on the right, east of the road, in similar for
mation ; Griffin in rear of Crawford, with Bartlett’s Brigade in
double column of regiments, three lines deep; my own brigade
next, somewhat in echelon to the right, with three battalion lines
in close order, while Gregory at first was held massed in my rear.
General Mackenzie’s cavalry, of the Army of the James, had
been ordered up from Dinwiddie, to cross the White Oak Road
and move forward with us covering our right flank. Neverthe
less, just as we were moving, General Griffin cautioned me :
“ Don’t be too sure about Mackenzie; keep a sharp look-out
for your own right.” Accordingly I had Gregory throw out a
small battalion as skirmishers and flankers, and march another
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regiment by the flank on our right, ready to face outwards, and
let his other regiment follow in my brigade column.
At four o’clock we moved down the Gravelly Run Church
Road, our lines as we supposed nearly parallel to the White
Oak Road, with Ayres directed on the angle of the enemy’s
works. Just as we started there came from General Warren a
copy of a diagram of the proposed movement. I was surprised
at this. It showed our front of movement to be quite oblique
to the White Oak Road,— as much as half a right angle,— with
the center of Crawford’s Division directed upon the angle, and
Ayres, of course, thrown far to the left, so as to strike the
enemy’s works half way to Five Forks. Griffin was shown as
following Crawford ; but the whole direction was such that all
of us would strike the enemy’s main line before any of us could
touch the White Oak Road. The diagram, far from clearing
my mind, added confusion to surprise. The order read : “ The
line will move forward as formed till it reaches the White Oak
Road, when it will swing around to the left, perpendicular to
the White Oak Road. General Merritt’s and General Custer’s
cavalry will charge the enemy’s line as soon as the infantry get
engaged.” This was perfectly clear. The whole corps was to
reach the White Oak Road before any portion of it should
change direction to the left; Ayres was to attack the angle,
and the rest of us swing round and sweep down the entrench
ments along the White Oak Road.
The diagram showed the Gravelly Run Church Road as leading
directly to and past the angle of the enemy’s works. The
formation shown led us across the Church Road and not across
the White Oak Road at all, which at the point of direction was
behind the enemy’s entrenched lines. Advancing to the White
Oak Road over the enemy’s breastworks, and then changing
front to flank in a hand-to-hand melee was a thing absurd to
conceive, and could not be intended to command.
Ill at ease at such confusion of mind, I rode over to General
Griffin, who with General Warren was close on my left at this
early stage of the movement, and asked for an explanation.

IO
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Griffin answers quickly: “ We will not worry ourselves about
diagrams. We are to follow Crawford. Circumstances will soon
develop our duty.” In the meantime we were moving right
square down the Church Road, and not oblique to it as the dia
gram indicated. However, I quieted my mind with the reflection
that the earth certainly was a known quantity, and the enemy
susceptible to discovery, whatever might be true of roads, dia
grams or understandings.
Crawford crossed the White Oak Road, his line nearly parallel
to it, without encountering the expected angle. This road, it
is to be remarked, made a considerable bend northerly at the
crossing of the Church Road, so that Ayres had not reached it
when Crawford and even Griffin were across. We naturally
supposed the angle was still ahead. Crawford immediately ran
into a sharp fire on his right front, which might mean the crisis.
I had been riding with Griffin on the left of my front line, but
now hastened over to the right, where I found Gregory earn
estly carrying out my instructions to guard that flank. I caught
a glimpse of some cavalry in the woods on our right, which I
judged to be Roberts’s North Carolina Brigade, that had been
picketing the White Oak Road, and so kept Gregory on the
alert. The influence of the sharp skirmish fire on Crawford’s
right tended to draw the men towards it; but I used all my
efforts to shorten step on the pivot and press the wheeling flank,
in order to be ready for the ° swing ” to the left. Still, the
firing ahead kept me dubious. It might mean Fitzhugh Lee’s
cavalry making a demonstration there; but from the persistence
of it was more likely to mean infantry reinforcements sent the
enemy from the Claiborne entrenchments where we had left
them the day before. It was afterwards seen how near it came
to being that.i
1 Wise’s, Grace’s and Hunton’s Brigades had been ordered out of the
Claiborne entrenchments that afternoon to attack the right flank of the Fifth
Corps ; but being obliged to take a roundabout way and getting entangled
among the streams and marshes north of the White Oak Road, they were
too late to reach the scene of action until all was over. Records, Warren
Court: Lee’s testimony, p. 473 : McGowan’s, p. 651 : Hunton’s, p. 626.
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I had managed, however, to gain towards the left until we
had fairly got past Crawford’s left rear. Some firing we had
heard in the supposed direction of our cavalry, but it did not
seem heavier than that in Crawford’s front. We were moving
rapidly, and had been out about twenty minutes from the
Church, and perhaps nearly a mile distant, when a sudden burst
of fire exactly on our left roused very definite thoughts. This
could only be from Ayres’s attack. I halted my line and rode
ahead through the woods to some high, cleared ground, the
southeastern corner of a large field, known as the “ Sydnor field,”
along the opposite edge of which I could see strong skirmishing
along Crawford’s front; and turning southerly, looking across
broken, scrubby ground, could see Ayres’s troops engaged in a
confused whirl of struggling groups, with fitful firing. This
was about as far away, I judged, as Crawford’s skirmishing,—
about six hundred yards. The great gap between these engage
ments made me feel that something was “all wrong.” I was
anxious about my duty. My superiors were not in sight. Bartlett
had closely followed Crawford, away to my right. But I could
see the corps flag in the Sydnor field, moving towards Crawford,
and on the other side, in a ravine half way to Ayres, I saw the
division flag. There was Ayres fighting alone, and that was
not in the program. There was Griffin down there ; that was
order enough for me, and I took the responsibility of looking
out for the left instead of the right, where my last orders com
mitted me. I pulled my brigade out of the woods by the left
flank, telling Gregory to follow; and, sending to Bartlett to let
him know what I was doing, pushed across a muddy stream and
up a rough ravine towards Ayres. Half way up, Griffin came to
meet me,— never more welcome. He gave the look I wanted,
and without coming near enough for words waved me to follow
up to the head of the ravine and to attack on my right, along
the bank where, hidden by brush and scrub, the enemy had a
line perpendicular to their main one on the White Oak Road,
and were commencing a slant fire in Ayres’s direction. Griffin
rode past me towards Warren and Bartlett.
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At the head of the gully all we had to do was to front into
line of battle, and scramble up the rough, brambly steep. The
moment we showed our heads, we were at close quarters with
the enemy. We exchanged volleys with good will, and then
came the rush. Our lines struck each other obliquely, like
shutting jaws. It was rather an awkward movement; for we
had to make a series of right half wheels by battalion to meet
the fire, and all the while gain to the left. Thus we stopped
that cross-fire on Ayres, who was now lost from sight by inter
vening scrubby woods. The brunt of this first fell on my stal
wart 185th New York, Colonel Sniper ; but Gregory1 soon
coming in by echelon on their right took the edge off that
enfilading fire.
Ayres’s fitful fire was approaching, and I rode over towards it.
Somewhere near the angle of the works I met Sheridan. He
had probably seen me putting my men in, and hence I escaped
censure for appearing. Indeed his criticism seemed to be that
there was not more of me, rather than less. “ By G—, that’s
what I want to see! ’ ’ was his greeting, “general officers at the
front. Where are your general officers ? ” I replied that I had
seen General Warren’s flag in the big field north of us, and
that seeing Ayres in a tight place I had come to help him, and
by General Griffin’s order. “Then,” cried he, with a vigor of
utterance worthy of the “ army in Flanders,” “ you take com
mand of all the infantry round here, and break this dam — ” I
didn’t wait to hear any more. That made good grammar as it
stood. I didn’t stand for anything, but spurred back to some
scattered groups of men, demoralized by being so far in the
rear, and not far enough to do them any good, yet too brave to
go back. Captain Brinton of Griffin’s staff came along, and I
took him with me down among these men to get them up.a I
found one stalwart fellow on his hands and knees behind a
1 His regiments were the 187th, 188th and 189th New York : thus the four
New York regiments constituted the right of my command.
2 Captain Laughlin of Griffin’s staff, says he also joined in this. Records,
Warren Court, p. 542.
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stump, answering with whimsical grimaces to the bullets coming
pretty thick and near. “ Look here, my good fellow,” I called
down to him, “ don’t you know you’ll be killed here in less than
two minutes ? That would be a shame. This is no place for you.
Go forward 1 ” “ But what can I do ? ” he cried ; “ I can’t stand
up against all this alone!” “No, that’s just it,” I replied.
“We’re forming here. I want you for guide center. Up, and
forward! ” Up and out he came like a hero. I formed those
“reserves” on him as guide, and the whole queer line,— two
hundred of them,— went in right up to the front and the thick
of it. My poor fellow only wanted a token of confidence and
appreciation to get possession of himself. He was proud of
what he did, and so I was for him.
I let the staff officers take these men in, for I had caught
sight of Ayres’s Third Brigade coming out of the woods right
behind me, and standing in the further edge of the scrubby
field. The men were much excited, but were making a good line.
General Gwyn was riding up and down their front in a demon
strative manner, but giving no sign of forward movement. I
thought this strange for him and bad for us all, in the pinch
things then were at, and with the warrant Sheridan had given
me galloped down to him and asked him if he was acting under
any particular orders from General Ayres. “No, General,” he
replied with an air of relief, “ I have lost Ayres. I have no
orders. I don’t know what to do.” “Then come with me,” I
said, “ I will take the responsibility. You shall have all credit.
Let me take your brigade for a moment! ” His men gave
me good greeting as I rode down their front and gave the order,
“ Forward, right oblique ! ” On they came, and in they went,
gallantly, gladly, just when and where they were needed, with
my own brigade fighting the “return,” and ready to take touch
with Ayres. His fire was advancing rapidly on my left, and I
rode over to meet him. Sheridan was by my side in a moment,
very angry. “ You are firing into my cavalry!” he exclaims,—
his face darkening with a checked expletive. I was under a
little pressure, too, and put on a bold air. “Then the cavalry
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have got into the rebels’ place. One of us will have to get out
of the way. What will you have us do, General ? ” “ Don’t
you fire into my cavalry, I tell you!” was the fierce rejoinder.
I felt a little left out in the cold by General Sheridan’s calling
them “ my cavalry,” as if we were aliens and did not belong to
him also; but, whosesoever they were, I could not see what
business they had up here at the “angle.” This was our part
of the field. The plan of the battle put them at the enemy’s
right and center, a mile away on the Dinwiddie Road and
beyond.
Fortunately for me, Ayres comes up, his troops right upon
the angle,— the right, the Maryland Brigade, on the “return,”
— brave Bowerman down — and Winthrop’s Brigade, — gallant
Winthrop gone,— reaching beyond, across the White Oak Road,
driving a crowd before them. I have only time to say to Ayres,
“ Gwyn is in on the right;” for Sheridan takes him in hand. “ I
tell you again, General Ayres, you are firing into my cavalry ! ”
“ We are firing at the people who are firing at us ! ” is the
quick reply. “ These are not carbine shot. They are minieballs. I ought to know.”
But I felt the point of Sheridan’s rebuke. As my oblique
fire across the “return ” was now so near the enemy’s main line
on the White Oak Road, it was not unlikely that if any of the
cavalry were up here on their front, I might be firing into them
and they into me. There was a worse thing yet: if we con
tinued advancing in that direction, in another minute we should
be catching Ayres’s fire on our left flank. He was already in,
with his men. Griffin coming up, detains me a moment. Sher
idan greets him well. “We flanked them gloriously!” he
exclaims with a full-charged smile implying that all was not over
yet. After a minute’s crisp remark, Griffin wheels away to the
right, and I am left with Sheridan. He was sitting right in the
focus of the fire, on his horse “ Rienzi,”— both about the color
of the atmosphere,— his demon pennon, good or ill, as it might
bode, red and white, two-starred, aloft just behind him. The
stream of bullets was pouring so thick it crossed my mind that
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what had been to me a poet’s phrase,— “darkening the air,” —
was founded on dead-level fact. I was troubled for Sheridan.
We could not afford to lose him. I made bold to tell him so,
and begged him not to stay there ; — the rest of us would try
to take care of things, and from that place he could be spared.
He gave me a comical look, and answered with a peculiar twist
in the toss of his head, that seemed to say he didn’t care much
for himself, or perhaps for me,— “Yes, I think I’ll go!” and
away he dashed, right down through Ayres’s left, down the
White Oak Road, into that triple cross-fire we had been quarrel
ing about.
I plunged into my business, to make up for this minute’s lost
time. My men were still facing too much across Ayres’s front,
and getting into the range of his fire. We had got to change
that, and swing to the right, down the rear of the enemy’s main
works. It was a whirl. Every way was front, and every way
was flank. The fighting was hand to hand. I was trying to
get the three angles of the triangle into something like two right
angles, and had swung my left well forward, opening quite a
gap in that direction, when a large body of the enemy came
rushing in upon that flank and rear. They were in line forma
tion, with arms at something like a “ ready,” which looked like
“business.” I thought it was our turn to be caught between
two fires, and that these men were likely to cut their way
through us. Rushing into the ranks of my left battalion I
shouted the order, “ Prepare to fire by the rear rank! ” My
men faced about at once, disregarding the enemy in front; but
at this juncture our portentous visitors threw down their mus
kets, and with hands and faces up cried out, “ We surrender,”
running right in upon us and almost over us. I was very glad
of it, though more astonished, for they outnumbered us largely.
I was a little afraid of them, too, lest they might find occasion
to take arms again and revoke the “consent of the governed.”
They were pretty solid commodities, but I was very willing to
exchange them for paper token of indebtedness in the form of a
provost marshal’s receipt. So getting my own line into shape
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again, I took these well-mannered men, who had been standing
us so stiff a fight a few minutes before, with a small escort out
over the “return,” into the open field in rear, and turned them
over to one of Sheridan’s staff, with a request for a receipt
when they were counted.1
In the field I find Ayres, who is turning over a great lot of
prisoners. The “ angle ” and the whole “return ” are now car
ried, but beyond them the routed enemy are stubbornly resisting.
I have time for a word with Ayres now, and to explain my
taking up Gwyn so sharply. He is not in the mood to blame
me for anything. He explains also. He had been suddenly
attacked on his left, and had been obliged to change front
instantly with two of his brigades. Their two commanders,
Winthrop and Bowerman, falling almost at the first stroke, he
had taken these brigades in person, and put them in, without
sending any word to Gwyn on his right. I could see how it
was. Losing connection, Gwyn was at a loss what to do, and in
the brief time Ayres was routing the enemy who had attacked
him, I had come upon Gwyn and had put him in, really ahead of
the main line of Ayres, who soon came up to him. So it all
came about right for Ayres.2
1 The receipt sent me bore the whole number of prisoners turned over by
me during the battle ; but most of them were taken in this encounter. This
acknowledges from my command two colonels, six captains, eleven lieu
tenants, and a thousand and fifty men sent in by my own brigade ; and four
hundred and seventy men by Gregory’s. It is not impossible that some of
these prisoners turned over to General Sheridan’s provost marshal, may
have been counted twice,— w'ith the cavalry captures as well as my own.
It should be said that the prisoners taken by us were due to the efficiency
and admirable behavior of all the troops in our part of the field near the
“angle,” and not alone to that of my immediate command.

2 To complete this reference, I will mention that Brevet Brigadier-General
Gwyn was colonel of the 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers, in Griffin’s Division,
and had been assigned to command one of Ayres’s Brigades. Not long
afterwards I came in command of the division, and, a general court martial
being convened, charges were preferred against Gwyn by some who did not
understand the facts of this occurrence as well as I did. When the papers
reached me, I disapproved them and sent them back with the endorsement
that General Gwyn had done his best under peculiarly perplexing circum-
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General Bartlett now came appealing for assistance. Two of
his regiments had gone off with Crawford, and Bartlett had
more than he could do to make head against a stout resistance
the enemy were making on a second line turned back near the
Ford Road. I helped him pick up a lot of stragglers and asked
Gregory to give him the 188th New York for assistance.
Meanwhile Warren, searching for Crawford, had come upon
his First Brigade, Kellogg’s, and had faced it southerly towards
the White Oak Road, as a guide for a new point of direction
for that division, and had then gone off in search of the
rest of these troops to bring them in on the line. There
upon one of Sheridan’s staff officers came across Kellogg stand
ing there, and naturally ordered him to go forward into the
“fight.” Kellogg questioned his authority, and warm words
took the place of other action, till at length Kellogg concluded
it best to obey Sheridan’s representative, and moved promptly
forward, striking somewhere beyond the left of the enemy’s
refused new flank. It seems also that Crawford’s Third Brig
ade, Coulter’s, which was in his rear line, had anticipated orders
or got Warren’s, and moved by the shortest line in the direction
Kellogg was taking. So Crawford himself was on the extreme
wheeling flank, with only Baxter’s Brigade and two regiments
of Bartlett’s of the First Division immediately in hand. His
brigades were now moving in echelon by the left, which was in
fact about the order of movement originally prescribed, and that
which the whole corps actually took up, automatically as it
were, or by force of the situation. Our commands were queerly
mixed ; men of every division of the corps came within my juris
diction, and something like this was probably the case with
several other commanders. But that made no difference ; men
and officers were good friends. There was no jealousy among
us subordinate commanders. We had eaten salt together when
we had not much else. This liveliness of mutual interest and
stances, and had gone in with his brigade handsomely, under my own eye at
a critical moment of the battle. I believed this to be justice to a brave
officer.
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support, I may remark, is sometimes of great importance in the
developments of a battle.
The hardest hold-up was in front of my left center, the
First Battalion of the 198th Pennsylvania. I rode up to the gallant
Glenn, commanding it and said, “ Major Glenn, if you will break
that line you shall have a colonel’s commission! ” It was a
hasty utterance, and the promise unmilitary, perhaps ; but my
every energy was focussed on that moment’s issue. Nor did
that earnest soldier need a personal inducement; he was already
carrying out the general order to press the enemy before him,
with as much effect as we could reasonably expect. But it was
deep in my mind how richly he already deserved this promotion,
and I resolved that he should get it now. It was this thought
and purpose which no doubt shaped my phrase, and pardoned it.
Glenn sprung among his men, calling out, “ Boys, will you fol
low me ? ” wheeled his horse and dashed forward, without
turning to see who followed. Nor did he need. His words
were a question; his act an order. On the brave fellows go
with a cheer into the hurricane of fire. Their beautiful flag
sways gracefully aloft with the spring of the brave youth bear
ing it, lighting the battle-smoke; three times it goes down to
earth covered in darkening eddies, but rises ever again passing
from hand to hand of dauntless young heroes. Then bullettorn and blood-blazoned it hovers for a moment above a breast
work, while the regiment goes over like a wave. This I saw from
my position to the left of them where I was pressing on the rest
of my command. The sight so wrought upon me that I
snatched time to ride over and congratulate Glenn and his regi
ment. As I passed into a deeper shadow of the woods, I met
two men bearing his body,— the dripping blood marking their
path. They stopped to tell me. I saw it all too well. He had
snatched a battle flag from a broken regiment trying to rally on
its colors, when a brute bullet of the earth once pronounced
good, but since cursed for man’s sin, struck him down to its
level. I could stop but a moment, for still on my front was
rush and turmoil and tragedy. I could only bend down over
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him from the saddle and murmur unavailing words. “ General,
I have carried out your wishes ! ” —this was his only utterance.
It was as if another bullet had cut me through. I almost fell
across my saddle bow. My wish ? God in heaven, no more
my wish than thine, that this fair body, still part of the unfallen
“good,” should be smitten to the sod,— that this spirit born of
thine should be quenched by the accursed!
What dark misgivings searched me as I took the import of
these words ! What sharp sense of responsibility for those who
have committed to them the issues of life and death I Why
should I not have let this onset take its general course and men
their natural chances ? Why choose out him for his death, and
so take on myself the awful decision into what home irreparable
loss and measureless desolation should cast their unlifted burden ?
The crowding thought choked utterance. I could only bend
my face low to his and answer : “ Colonel, I will remember my
promise ; I will remember yozi! ” and press forward to my place,
where the crash and crush and agony of struggle summoned
me to more of the same. War! — nothing but the final, infi
nite good, for man and God, can accept and justify human work
like that !
I feared most of all, I well remember,— such hold had this
voice on me,— that it might not be given me to be found among
the living, so that I could fulfill my word to him. But divine
grace and pity granted me this. As soon as the battle was
over, I sent forward by special messenger my recommendation
for two brevets for him, in recognition of his conspicuous gal
lantry and great service in every battle of this campaign, up to
this last hour. These were granted at once, and Glenn passed
from us to other recognition, “ Brevet Colonel of United States
Volunteers,”—and that phrase, so costly won, so honorable
then, made common since, has seemed to me ever after, tame and
something like travesty.1
1 I sought for him from the Governor of Pennsylvania lineal promotion
in his regiment, though he had but few hours to live. But that grade was
held by an accomplished gentleman detached from his regiment on office
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By this time Warren had found Crawford, who with Baxter’s
Brigade had been pursuing Munford’s dismounted cavalry all
the way from where we had crossed the White Oak Road, by a
wide detour reaching almost to Hatcher’s Run, until he had
crossed the Ford Road, quite in rear of the breaking lines which
Ransom and Wallace and Wood were trying to hold together.1
Hence he was in position to do them much damage, both by
cutting off their retreat by the Ford Road and taking many
prisoners, and also by completing the enemy’s envelopment.
To meet this, the enemy, instead of giving up the battle as they
would have been justified in doing stripped still more their
main works in front of our cavalry by detaching nearly the
entire brigade of General Terry, now commanded by Colonel
Mayo, and facing it quite to its rear pushed it down the Ford
Road and across the fields to resist the advance of Warren with
Crawford.
We, too, were pressing hard on the Ford Road from the east,
so that all were crowded into that whirlpool of the fight. Just as
I reached it, Captain Brinton of Griffin’s staff dashed up at head
long speed and asked if I knew that Griffin was in command of
the corps. I was astonished at first, and incredulous afterwards.
I had heard nothing from General Warren since I saw his flag
away in the Sydnor field when I was breaking out from the
column of march to go to Ayres’s support. My first thought
duties in the cities, and there was no place for Glenn. The colonel, dear
old Sickel, was in hospital with an amputated arm, shattered at the Quaker
Road three days before. Within that time this regiment had now lost in
battle colonel, major and adjutant, and all we could secure for the rest of
the service, that great regiment of fourteen companies, was a major’s
rank. This, indeed, was worthily bestowed. It came to Captain John
Stanton, who after the fall of Sickel and Macuen, had acted as a field officer
with fidelity and honor, and had distinguished himself in the struggle for
the flag snatched by Glenn with more than mortal energy and at mortal cost.
1 To my grief over the costs of this struggle was added now another,
when borne past me on the right came the form of Colonel Farnham of the
16th Maine, now on Crawford’s staff, who, sent to bear an order into this
thickening whirl, was shot through the breast and fell as we thought mor
tally wounded ; but the courage and fortitude, which never forsook him, car
ried him through this also.
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was that he was killed. I asked Brinton what he meant. He
told me the story. General Warren when he got to the rear of
the Ford Road sent an enthusiastic message by Colonel Locke,
his chief of staff, to Sheridan saying that he was in the enemy’s
rear, cutting off his retreat, and had many prisoners. This
message met scant courtesy. Sheridan’s patience was exhausted.
“By G—, sir, tell General Warren he wasn’t in the fight I”
Colonel Locke was thunderstruck. “ Must I tell General War
ren that, sir?” asked he. “Tell him that, sir;” came back
the words like hammer-blows. “ I would not like to take a ver
bal message like that to General Warren. May I take it down
in writing?” “Take it down, sir; tell him, by G—, he was
not at the front 1” This was done. Locke, the old and only
adjutant-general of the Fifth Corps, himself just back from a
severe wound in the face on some desperate front with Warren,
never felt a blow like that. Soon thereafter Sheridan came
upon General Griffin, and without preface or index, told the
astonished Griffin, “ I put you in command of the Fifth CorpsI”
This was Brinton’s story ; dramatic enough, surely; pathetic,
too. I hardly knew how to take it. I thought it possible Sheri
dan had told every general officer he met, as he had told me, to
take command of all the men he could find on the field and push
them in. I could not think of Warren being so wide-off an
exception.
Pressing down towards the Forks, some of Ayres’s men
mingled with my own, on emerging into a little clearing I saw
Sheridan riding beside me like an apparition. Yet he was
pretty certain flesh and blood. I felt a little nervous ; — not in
the region of my conscience, nor with any misgiving of the day’s
business ; but because I was alone with Sheridan. His expres
sion was at its utmost bent; intent and content, incarnate will.
But he greeted me kindly, and spoke freely of the way things
had been going. We were riding down inside the works in the
woods covering the Forks and Ford Road, now the new focus
of the fight. Just then an officer rode flightily up from that
direction, exclaiming to General Sheridan, “ We are on the
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enemy’s rear, and have got three of their guns.” “ I don’t care
a d— for their guns, or you either, sir. What are you here for ?
Go back to your business, where you belong! What I want is
that Southside Road.” The officer seemed to appreciate the
force of the suggestion, and the distant attraction of the South
side Road. I looked to see what would happen to me. There
were many men gathered round, or rather we had ridden into the
midst of them, as they stood amazed at the episode. The sun was
just in the tree-tops; — it might be the evening chill that was
creeping over us. Then Sheridan, rising in his stirrups, hat in
hand waving aloft at full arm’s length, face black as his horse, and
both like a storm-king, roared out: “I want you men to under
stand we have a record to make before that sun goes down that
will make hell tremble 1— I want you there ! ” I guess they were
ready to go ; to that place or any other where death would find
them quickest; and the sooner they got there, the safer for them.
Griffin came down now from the right, dashed ahead of
me and jumped his horse over the works. I thought myself
a pretty good rider, but preferred a lower place in the breast
works. My horse saw one and made for it. Just as he neared
the leap, a bullet struck him in the leg, and gave him more
impetus than I had counted on. But I gave him free rein and
held myself easy, and over we went, and down we came, luckily
feet-foremost, almost on top of one of the enemy’s guns, which
we were fortunate enough not to “ take.” In truth, there was
a queer “ parliament of religions ” just then and there, at this
Five Forks focus. And it came in this wise. As Ransom’s
and Wallace’s and Wood’s reinforced but wasting lines had
fallen back before us along the north and east side of their
works, our cavalry kept up sharp attacks upon their right across
the works, which by masterly courage and skill they managed
to repel, replacing as best they could the great gaps made in
their defences by the withdrawal of so many of Steuart’s and
Terry’s Brigades, to form the other sides of their retreating
“hollow square.” Driven in upon themselves, and over much
“ concentrated,” they were so penned in there was not a fair

FIVE FORKS.

23

chance to fight. Seizing the favorable moment Fitzhugh’s and
Pennington’s Brigades of Devins’s and Custer’s cavalry made a
magnificent dash right over the works each side the Forks, just
an instant before Ayres’s and Griffin’s lines had reached that
focus. Bartlett also, with some of Crawford’s men following,
came down nearly at the same time from the north on the Ford
Road. All, therefore, centered on the three guns there; so
that for a moment there was a queer colloquy over the silent
guns. The cavalry officers say, and perhaps with good reason,
that they captured the guns, but Griffin would not let them
“take” them.
Crawford and Bartlett also both report the
capture of the guns ; but as the enemy had abandoned them
before these troops struck them, the claimants of the capture
should be, content to rank their merits in the order of their com
ing. There were, however, some guns further up the Ford
Road,— whether those at first under Ransom on the “refused”
flank, or those hurried from Pegram’s command on the White
Oak Road to the support of the breaking lines vainly essaying
to cover the Ford Road. Of the capture of these there is no
doubt. These Major West Funk,— a strange misnomer, but a
better name in German than in English, showing there is some
“sparkle” in his blood,—actually “took,” by personal touch,—
both ways. First dodging behind trees before their canister,
then shooting down the horses and mules attached to the lim
bers, as well as the gunners who stood by them, his two little
regiments made a rush for the battery, overwhelmed it, unmanned
it, and then swept on, leaving the guns behind them, making no
fuss about it, and so very likely to get no credit for it. This
little episode, however, was not unobserved by me; for these
two regiments—the 121st and I42d Pennsylvania, now attached
to Crawford’s Division, were all that was left to us of the dear
lost old First Corps, and of my splendid brigade from it in
Griffin’s Division, in the ever memorable charge of “ Fort
Hell,” June 18, 1864.
“ Taking guns ” is a phrase associated with very stirring
action. But words have a greater range than even guns. There
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is the literal, the legal, the moral, the figurative, the poetic, the
florid, the transcendental. All these atmospheres may give
meaning and color to a word. But dealing with solid fact, there
is no more picturesque and thrilling sight, no more telling, test
ing deed, than to “ take a battery ” in front. Ploughed through
by booming shot; torn by ragged bursts of shell; riddled by
blasts of whistling canister; — straight ahead to the guns hid
den in their own smoke; straight on to the red, scorching flame
of the muzzles,— the giant grains of cannon-powder beating,
burning, sizzling into the cheek; then in upon them! — pistol
to rifle-shot; saber to bayonet; musket-butt to handspike and
rammer ; the brief frenzy of passion ; the wild “hurrah ” ; then
the sudden, unearthly silence ; the ghastly scene ; the shadow
of death; the aureole of glory ; — much that is telling here, but
more that cannot be told. Surely it were much better if guns
must be taken, to take them by flank attack, by skilful manoeuver, by moral suasion, by figure of speech, or even by proxy.
But this is digression, or reminiscence. For the matter in
hand, the guns taken at the Forks and on the Ford Road, with
due acknowledgements of individual valor, were taken by all the
troops who closed in around them, front, flank and rear; by the
whole movement, indeed, from the brain of the brilliant com
mander who planned, to the least man who pressed forward to
fulfil his high resolve.
We had pushed the enemy a mile from the left of their
works,—the angle, their tactical center,—and were now past the
Forks. Something remained to be done, according to Sheridan’s
biblical intimation. But the enemy made no more resolute,
general stand. Only little groups, held back and held together
by individual character, or the magnetism of some superior offi
cer, made front, and gave check. For a moment, after the deaf
ening din and roar, the woods seemed almost given back to
nature, save for the clinging smoke and broken bodies and
breaking moans which betokened man’s intervention.
Our commands were much mixed, but the men well moving
on, when in this slackening of the strain, Griffin and Ayres, who
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were now riding with me, spoke regretfully, sympathizingly of
Warren. They thought he had sacrificed himself for Crawford,
who had not proved equal to the demands of the situation.
“ Poor Warren, how he will suffer for this I” they said with many
variations of the theme. Griffin did not say a word about his
being placed in command of the corps. He was a keen observer,
a sharp critic, able and prompt to use a tactical advantage; but
he was not the man to take pleasure which cost another’s pain,
or profit from another’s loss. It was high promotion, gratifying
to a soldier’s ambition ; it was special preferment, for he was
junior to Crawford. But he took it all modestly, like the soldier
and man he was, thinking more of duty and service than of self.
Sheridan came upon us again, bent to his purpose. “ Get
together all the men you can,” he says, “and drive on while you
can see your hand before you!” The men were widely scat
tered from their proper commanders. Griffin told me to gather
the men of the First Division and bring them to the White Oak
Road. I rode in along the ground of the wide pursuit, and kept
my bugler sounding all the brigade calls of the division. This
brought our officers and men to the left. Among others Gen
eral Warren came riding slowly from the right. I took pains to
greet him cheerfully, and explained to him why I was sounding
all the bugle calls. “ You are doing just right,” he replies,
“but I am not in command of the corps.” That was the first
authoritative word I had heard spoken to this effect. I told him
I had heard so, but that General Sheridan had been putting us
all in command of everything we could get in hand, and perhaps
after the battle was over we would all get back where we
belonged. I told him I was now moving forward under Sheri
dan’s and Griffin’s order, and rode away from him towards the
left with my gathered troops, shadowed in spirit for Warren’s
sake. I could not be sorry for the corps, nor that Griffin was
in command of it: he had the confidence of the whole corps.
And however sharp was Griffin’s satire, he had the generosity
which enables one to be truly just, and never made his subordi
nates vicarious victims of his own interior irritations.
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We had now come to the edge of a wide field across the road
and the works on the enemy’s right, known as the Gilliam field.
Here I came to Sheridan and Griffin, my troops all up, and well
in hand. A sharp cavalry fight was going on, in which some of
Ayres’s men and my own had taken part. On the right, along
the White Oak Road were portions of Crawford’s infantry that
had swung around so quickly as to get ahead of us and they
were the ones now principally engaged.
Here Warren took his leave of the corps, himself under a
shadow as somber as the scene and with a flash as lurid as the
red light of the battle-edge rolling away into the darkness and
distance of the deep woods. When our line was checked at this
last angle, Griffin had ordered one of Crawford’s colonels to
advance. The colonel, a brave and well-balanced man, replied
that where soldiers as good as Griffin’s men had failed, he did
not feel warranted in going in without proper orders. “Very
well I order you in ! ” says Griffin, without adding that he did it
as commander of the corps. The gallant colonel bows,— it
is Richardson, of the 7th Wisconsin,— grasps his regimental
colors in his own hand, significant of the need and his resolution
in face of it, and rides forward in advance of his men. What
can they do but follow such example ? General Warren, with
intensity of feeling that is now desperation, snatches his corps
flag from the hands of its bearer, and dashes to Richardson’s
side. And so the two leaders ride, the corps commander and
his last visible colonel,— colors aloft, reckless of the growing
distance between them and their followers, straight for the
smoking line — straight for the flaming edge ; not hesitating at
the breastworks, over they go ; one with swelling tumult of soul,
where the passion of suffering craves outburst in action; the
other with obedience and self-devotion, love-like, stronger than
death. Over the breastworks, down among the astonished foe;
one of whom, instinct overmastering admiration, aims at the
foremost a deadly blow, which the noble youth rushes forward
to parry, and shielding with his own the breast of his uncaring
commander, falls to earth, bathing his colors with his blood.
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Need more be told ? Do men tarry at such a point ? One
crested wave sweeps on; another, broken, rolls away. All is
lost; and all is won. Slowly Warren returns over the somber
field. At its forsaken edge a staff officer hands him a crude
field order. Partly by the lurid flashes of the last guns, partly
by light of the dying day, he reads : “ Major-General Warren,
commanding the Fifth Army Corps, is relieved from duty and
will at once report for orders to Lieutenant-General Grant,
commanding Armies of the United States. By command of
Major-General Sheridan.”
With almost the agony of death upon his face, Warren
approaches Sheridan and asks him if he cannot reconsider the
order. “ Reconsider. Hell1 I don’t reconsider my decisions.
Obey the order 1 ” fell the last thunder-bolt on Warren’s heart.
The battle has done its worst for him. The iron has entered
his soul. With bowed head and without a word, he turns from
the spectral groups of friend and foe mingled in the dark, for
bidding cloud of night, to report to the one man on earth who
held power over what to him was dearer than life,— and takes
his lonely way over that eventful field, along that fateful White
Oak Road, which for him had no end on earth.
After nightfall the corps was drawn in around Five Forks,
for a brief respite. We were all so worn out that our sinking
bodies took our spirits with them. We had reasons to rejoice
so far as victory gives reasons ; but there was a strange weight
on the hearts of us all. Of things within ? or things without ?
We could not tell. It was not wholly because Warren had
gone; although in the sundering of old ties there is always
a strain, and Warren had been part of the best history of the
Fifth Corps from the beginning. And even about victory,—
it is not for itself; it looks to a cause and an end. And we
thought of this ; pondering on the worth and the cost, and to
what that end might unfold to which this was the beginning.
There were other emotions, too, which will arise when night
draws over a scene like that, and with it the thoughts come
home.
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We grouped ourselves around Griffin at the Forks, center of
the whirling struggle,— we who were left of those once accus
tomed to gather about him in field or bivouac,— alas for those
who came no more I — half-reclining against the gloomy tree
trunks and rudely piled defences so gallantly lost and won, torn
by splintering shot and rush of men; half-stretched on the
ground moistened by the dews of night and the blood of the
mingled brave; hushed at heart, speaking but in murmurs
answering to the whispers of the night; with a tremulous sensi
tiveness, an awe that was not fear. Few things we said ; but
they were not of the history that is told.
Suddenly emerged from the shadows a compact form, with
vigorous stride unlike the measure and mood of ours and a voice
that would itself have thrilled us had not the import of it
thrilled us more. “ Gentlemen,” says Sheridan, as we half
started to our feet, “ I have come over to see you. I may have
spoken harshly to some of you to-day ; but I would not have it
hurt you. You know how it is : we had to carry this place, and
I was fretted all day till it was done. You must forgive me. I
know it is hard for the men, too ; but we must push. There is
more for us to do together. I appreciate and thank you all.”
And this is Phil Sheridan! A new view of him surely, and
amazingly. All the repressed feeling of our hearts sprung out
towards him. We were ready to blame ourselves if we had been
in any way the cause of his trouble. But we thought we had
borne a better part than that.
We had had a taste of his style of fighting, and we liked it.
In some respects it was different from ours ; although this was
not a case to test all qualities. We had formed some habits of
fighting too. Most of us there had been through Antietam,
Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Mine Run, The
Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, Bethesda Church, The
North Anna, Petersburg; — we had formed habits. We went
into a fight with knowledge of what it meant and what was to
be done. We went at things with dogged resolution; — not
much show ; not much flare ; not much accompaniment of brass
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instruments. But we could give credit to more brilliant things.
We could see how this voice and vision, this swing and color,
this vivid impression on the senses, carry the pulse and will of
men. This served as the old “fife and drum,” and “Hail
Columbia,” that used to stir men’s souls. We had a habit, per
haps, drawn from dire experience, and for which we had also
Grant’s quite recent sanction1, when we had carried a vital point
or had to hold one, to entrench.
But Sheridan does not
entrench. He pushes on; carrying his flank and rear with
him,— rushing, flashing, smashing. He transfuses into his sub
ordinates the vitality and energy of his purpose; transforms
them into part of his own mind and will. He shows the power
of a commander,— inspiring both confidence and fear.
As a rule, our corps and army commanders were men of
brains rather than of magnetism. They relied on brains in
others. Warren was one of these. He was well capable of
organizing an entire plan of battle on a great field. He would
have been an admirable chief of staff of the army. There
brains outweigh temperament. He could see the whole com
prehensively and adjust the parts subordinate to it. But he had
a certain ardor of temperament which, although it brought him
distinction as a subordinate commander, seemed to work against
him as corps commander. It led him to go in personally with a
single division or brigade, when a sharp fight came on. Doing
this when having a larger command, one takes the risk of losing
grasp of the whole. That was what he did in trying to change
front with Crawford’s Division under fire. It was a difficult
thing. He put his personality into it; just as Sheridan would
do and did in this very fight. It was the cruelest thing to say
of him that he “was not in the fight.” This blamed him for
the very opposite of what had been complained of as his chief
fault; and this time the accusation was not true. He was in
the fight; and that in fact was his fault; at any rate it was his
iThe order to entrench on the White Oak Road, March 31. See War
Papers, Vol. I, p. 235.
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evil fate. That he felt this accusation keenly was manifest in that
last reckless onset in the charge in the Gilliam field : he would
let Sheridan see whether he was in the fight or not. But this
did no good. It was too late. If he had so brought Crawford
in where Griffin came, it might have saved him. But that long
labor of his out of Sheridan’s sight missed the moment. It was too
late. The day was done. So he rode through into the night.
In the later dispositions of the corps the several divisions
were moved out in directions which would best guard against
sudden attack, not unexpected: Crawford, down the Ford Road,
half way to the Run; Ayres out the White Oak Road on the
right, and Bartlett on the left, facing towards the enemy sup
posed to be gathered in their last stronghold where we had left
their main body the day before,— the Claiborne entrenchments.
It fell to me to be held in reserve, and by midnight my command
was left alone on the field over which the sweeping vision of
power had passed. The thunder and tumult of the day had
died with it. Now only the sighing of the night winds through
the pine tops took up the ghostly refrain; and moans from the
darkened earth beneath told where we also belonged. So the
night was not for sleep; but given to solemn and tender duties,
and to thoughts that passed beyond that field.

This is the story of Five Forks within my knowledge of what
was done and suffered there. It shows confusions and struggles
besides those of the contending lines. It shows extent and
complexity quite beyond what would appear from an outside
view of the movement or the orders concerning it. The story
that went out early, and has taken lodgment in the public mind,
is more simple. Taking its rise and keynote from Sheridan’s
report, somewhat intensified by his staff officers, and adopted
by Grant without feeling necessity of further investigation, this
story is that Sheridan and his cavalry, with the assistance of a
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part of Ayres’s Division, carried Five Forks with all its works,
angles and returns, its captives, guns and glory.1
The widely drawn and all-embracing testimony before the
Warren Court of Inquiry in 1879 and 1880, although in some
instances confused and even contradictory,— the result, how
ever, in no small degree of the preoccupation in the witnesses’
minds by the accounts so early and abundantly put forth, and
without rectification for so long a time,— yet reveals for all
some spreading of the plan of battle, a steadfast, well-connected
and well-executed conformity to the ideas under which the
battle was ordered. It also affords ample means of understand
ing the confusions and frictions which were actual passages in
the battle, and not artificial and intensified in statement under
the necessity of sustaining a thesis or vindicating an act of
authority. The light shed by these records and the official War
Records lately published enables us now, by some effort of
attention it is true, to see in proper perspective, sequence and
comprehension, the complex details of that battle.
The whole trouble and disturbance of Sheridan’s preconceived
image of the battle arose from a wide misunderstanding of the
relative positions of the Fifth Corps formation and that of the
enemy. We took the latter to be an entrenched line, which was
to be turned by a flank and rear attack. The general plan as
given to us verbally was well understood by all. The specific
written orders were in accordance with the idea in our minds.
“ The line will move forward as formed till it reaches the White
Oak Road, when it will swing around to the left, perpendicular
to the White Oak Road. General Merritt’s and General Custer’s
1 See for instance, Sheridan’s statement before the Warren Court,
Records, p. 118, and those of his officers all through this investigation.
Also Grant’s account of this battle : Memoirs, Vol. II, pp. 443-446 ; the
details of which, however, are so erroneous as to movements, their time
and place and bearing on the result, that they would not be recognized as
pertaining to that battle by anyone who was there ; — an observation which
adds to our sorrow at the distressing circumstances under which the distin
guished writer was compelled to conclude his last volume without opportu
nity for examining the then existing evidence in that case.
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cavalry will charge the enemy’s line as soon as the infantry
get engaged.” The intention evidently was that the left of the
Fifth Corps (Ayres) should strike the left of the enemy’s
entrenched line on the White Oak Road, and on this pivot the
corps should make a great left turn, and flank and envelop the
rebel position ; the cavalry in the meantime engaging the enemy’s
attention by vigorous demonstrations on their right and center.
It was a brilliant piece of tactics, and if properly carried out its
success was as certainly predicted as anything in warfare can be.
There was no lack of loyalty and earnestness. The importance
of the battle was felt, and Sheridan’s impatience shared by all.
It will seem strange that at the very start the diagram fur
nished for our guidance was the cause of serious confusion in our
minds by the disagreement of figure and fact, and of more serious
confusion of movement attending.
1. The diagram showed Crawford,— the extreme right of the
corps, directed on the angle, instead of Ayres,— the extreme
left. By this, not a man of the Fifth Corps could reach the
White Oak Road without doing so on top of the enemy
entrenched upon it. Swinging to the left on reaching it, would
have to be done inside the enemy’s lines, or in front of them at
close touch, presenting the right flank of each subdivision to
their raking fire.
2. The diagram placed the angle of the enemy’s works at the
crossing of the White Oak Road and the road we were formed
on,— the Gravelly Run Church Road; while as matter of fact,
the angle was twelve hundred yards west of this crossing.
So that “the line as formed” moving forward, instead of its
right striking the angle, as the diagram indicated, the left
of the line would pass it at the distance of nearly five hundred
yards.
3. The line as formed was not so oblique to the Church Road
as represented in the diagram. In fact, for our whole right,—
Crawford’s and Griffin’s Divisions,— it was nearly parallel to the
White Oak Road. But we soon discovered that at the crossing
of these roads the course of the latter bends northerly at an
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angle of nearly forty-five degrees. This shows how it was that
Crawford and Griffin struck the White Oak Road squarely; and
how it was that Ayres’s right crossed it some time before his
left, and was struck, as was Crawford, by the enemy’s dis
mounted cavalry posted there.
4. It is now perfectly shown, although not clearly held in
mind by all, even at the Warren investigation, that the cele
brated “angle” and “return” were not the extreme left of the
enemy’s lines, nor of his fortified position, as would appear by
the diagram.1 East of the angle as given there, was an extended
work of similar character on the White Oak Road, but across
it,— south of it,— running at least one hundred and sixty yards.
It was this from which Ayres was struck on the left, when he
had to change front. A thousand yards still east of this, near
the Church Road crossing, was also a considerable breastwork
thrown up by Munford’s dismounted cavalry early in the after
noon. It was from this that the center of our advance, Ayres
and Crawford, was first struck.2
5. Nor were the troops in the main works and about the
“ angle ” and the “ return,” as both the orders and the diagram
indicated, by any means all the force we had to contend with
that day. Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry, dismounted, now commanded
1 The confusing effect of this diagram was manifest in much of the testi
mony from remembrance given at the Warren Court of Inquiry. The “ dia
gram ” as impressed upon all, gave only the “return ” and the “angle ” at
it, as the easternmost extent of the Confederate works. Judging from this,
whatever force should be encountered would be assumed to be at the angle
and the return: whereas, it is now the certain result of somewhat rapid and
confused experience at the time, and of very careful examinations and meas
urements made since, that the main works extended one hundred and sixty
yards still east of the angle, on the south side of the White Oak Road. But
the witnesses before the court frequently spoke of this advanced work, from
which Ayres was struck, the “ angle ” and even the “ return.” This explains
Sheridan’s remark to Griffin: “ We flanked them gloriously.” A remark
which would not apply to an assault on a solid angle like that at the
“return.” It is pretty hard to flank a right angle,—especially when
manned by such men as were there.
* Testimony of General Munford, Warren Court Records, p. 442.

34

FIVE FORKS.

by Munford,— among them Stuart’s old brigade,— and as their
officers said, “as good marksmen as ever fired a gun,”1 were
confronting our advance with the solid resistance of twelve
hundred to fifteen hundred men2 west of the Church Road, and
Roberts’ North Carolina cavalry, six or eight hundred men,
on the east side of it.3 Thus all our way around was con
tested by not less than two thousand skilled and veteran
soldiers,— no sort of people to be ignored by us, nor by those
reporting the battle to be wholly on the angle and on our cav
alry front.
Now who is responsible for this misapprehension? Warren
made the diagram from information received from Sheridan.
It is to be presumed that the staff-officer who reported the situ
ation to General Sheridan was carefully cross-examined. It is,
indeed, quite possible that as the enemy were busily at work
every moment after they were aware of the approach of the
Fifth Corps by the Church Road, these extended works were
not thrown up at the time of the staff-officer’s reconnoissance.
Nor perhaps had Munford’s cavalry then reached that portion
of the field. But a discrepancy of one thousand yards for a
vital point like that, is a pretty wide error. Warren is perhaps
responsible for accepting and acquiescing in the information so
given, and for not assuring himself more perfectly of the condi
tions in his front of attack. But Sheridan saw and approved
the diagram; and if anybody is to be blamed, he must be
considered ultimately, and in a military sense, responsible for
these misapprehensions.
We are not demanding perfection
for General Sheridan. His objective was the enemy. If he
cared less for diagrams or graphic sketches, it must be par
doned. To err is human; but the whole of that characteristic
of humanity should not be charged to the Fifth Corps or its
commander.
1 Same, pp. 448, 453.
a Same, p. 459 ; and Fitzhugh Lee’s testimony, p. 478, putting the whole
cavalry at three thousand two hundred.
3 Testimony General Munford, Records Warren Court, p. 443.
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But the case against Warren seems to be labored. Small
matters are accentuated and accumulated as if to make weight
for some special conclusion.
First there is the accusation of a manner of indifference on
Warren’s part previous to the action. As to this, opinions
would differ as different minds or tempers might take it. There
is no doubt this feeling on General Sheridan’s part was verydeep and disturbing. That must be considered. Those who
knew Warren best saw no indifference. He was not in his usual
spirits,— and we cannot wonder at it,— but he was intense
rather than expressive. He knew what was depending, and
what was called for, and put his energies into the case more
mentally than muscularly. His subordinates understood his
earnestness.
It was charged by General Sheridan and some of his staff that
the right of Ayres’s line, which they call skirmishers, behaved
badly on receiving the first fire,— that they threw themselves on
the ground and fired into the air; that they even broke and
ran ; and that General Warren did not exert himself to correct
the confusion. As if the corps commander’s duty was to be on
a brigade skirmish line in a great wide-sweeping movement of
his entire corps t Sheridan and Ayres would seem to be assist
ance enough for Gwyn in handling his little skirmish line. But
Sheridan says more deliberately and explicitly before the Warren
Court: “ Our skirmish line lay down ; the fire of the enemy was
very slight. The line became confused, and commenced firing
straight in the air.” A somewhat difficult operation, it may be
remarked parenthetically, for men lying down,— unless the result
ant of two such compound forces as the enemy in front and
Sheridan behind made them roll over flat on their backs, calling
on heaven for aid. “The poor fellows,” he continues, “had
been fighting behind breastworks for a long period, and wnen
they got out to attack breastworks, they seem to have been a
little timid.”1 They were attacking breastworks then, out at the
Church Road crossing I But this is perhaps a fling at the Army
1 Testimony, Warren Court Records, p. 254.
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of the Potomac in the soft places of “Grant’s Campaign,” in
which they lost more men than Lee had in his entire army, and
saved the other quarter by now and then entrenching when put
momentarily on the defensive. Ayres does not relish this
remark, whether intended for excuse or sarcasm. He answers
that his troops, most of them, had fought at Gettysburg, and
through the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, Petersburg
and the Weldon Railroad, and none of them had ever but once
fought behind breastworks.1
The unsteadiness of Ayres’s skirmishers was no vital matter.
It was a trifling circumstance, hardly relevant to the charge of
indifference and incompetency on Warren’s part. It was not
cause enough to set thunderbolts flying over the whole Fifth
Corps. At the worst, the commander of the skirmish line
might have been reprimanded and “ relieved ; ” but hardly the
commander of the corps.
I am pained on more accounts than one to find that eneral
Grant in his notice of our action that afternoon, as given in his
Memoirs, Volume II, page 443, uses the following language:
“ Griffin’s Division, in backing to get out of the way of a severe
cross-fire of the enemy, was found marching away from the
fighting.” He adds, however, that after awhile it was “brought
back ” and did excellent service. This is an extraordinary state
ment,— or at any rate it is to be hoped it is not an ordinary one
in writing history,— to put down authoritatively as the record
of our conduct and spirit that day.
“ Backing to get out of the way of fire ? ” riffin’s Division ?
At what point in their history ? “ Backing from a cross-fire ”
here ? The fire first followed was that of Munford’s cavalry on
their front and right while advancing according to orders ; and
“ backing ” from this would have thrown them directly on the
celebrated “angle,”—where indeed they did arrive most timely,
and on purpose to meet a “cross-fire,” which they did not back
out of. “ Away from the fighting ? ” Let Ayres, and Ransom,
and Wallace, and Wood, and Sheridan, answer. “Found.”
1 Testimony, Warren Court Records, p. 450.
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By whom ? “ Brought back.” By what ? They were found at
the “angle,” and brought themselves there ahead of the finders.
Saul, the seeker of old, got more lost than the domestic wan
derers he was after: they were in their place before he was;
but the seeker found a kingdom, and doubtless forgave himself
and the asses.
But this is a very serious charge against Griffin’s Division,
and in time of active service would warrant a court of inquiry.
And even now the statement of one so revered cannot but be
injurious to its reputation, and its honor.
To have stated this authoritatively as fact without being sure
of it is so unlike the truthfulness and magnanimity of that great
character, we are forced to believe he has here fallen before his
only weakness,— that of trusting too implicitly to those whom
he liked. If General Grant was to honor us by his notice at all,
we should suppose he would acquaint himself with the facts.
He seems, however, on so comparatively unimportant a topic, to
have innocently absorbed the impression made upon him by par
ties interested in justifying an arbitrary act of authority. If
General Grant could have looked into the case, he would have
seen that this statement was not only unjust, but the very
reverse of truth. The pressing sense of his approaching end
compelled General Grant to finish his book in haste. However
painful it be to review words written under circumstances so
affecting, it is but just to inquire into the grounds of the
accusation.
Griffin’s orders were to follow Crawford ; but the spirit of his
position was that of a reserve ; and this is held in hand ready to
go in al a critical moment when and where most needed. All
the facts necessary to adduce are that this division strictly, and
with painstaking fidelity,— not in stupid quiescence,— followed
its orders, until a moment came when it promptly acted in
accordance with the spirit of its orders and of the whole plan of
battle. It was “ reserved ” for that very kind of thing. And no
one can say it fell short of its duty or the standard of its
ancient honor.
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The evidence is explicit and ample that the head of this
division was at the angle of the works with Ayres and helped
him to carry it. This is directly testified to by commanding
officers of the “ Maryland Brigade ” on Ayres’s right, and of
the 4th Delaware on Gwyn’s right, who say that Griffin’s troops
were on the flank and rear of the rebel line at the angle before
they attacked it in front.1 This is confirmed by officers of
the highest character in Ransom’s Brigade on the left of the
angle.2 General Ayres says substantially the same in his testi
mony before the Warren Court.3 General Sheridan himself
admits this.4 It is evident, however, that in recounting his
impression of the fight at the angle he failed to give prominence
to the fact,— of no consequence to him, or to the general result,
as to the particular troops engaged; and moreover, if acknowl
edged, making against his charge that Warren did not bring in
his other divisions to support Ayres,— that Griffin’s troops
quite as much as Ayres’s took part in carrying that angle.
Indeed, he most probably regarded the troops of Griffin’s whom
he met here as part of Ayers’s command. For this would explain
most of the discrepances in his statements compared with estab
lished and admitted facts.
1 Colonel Stanton, who succeeded Bowerman in command of Ayres’s
Second Brigade, says the enemy were struck on their left and rear and
forced in confusion on his front at the angle. Captain Buckingham, com
manding 4th Delaware, the extreme right of Ayres’s Division, says our
troops had struck the enemy’s works from the north at the time he reached
them in front, facing west.
2 Captain Faucette, 56th North Carolina, Ransom’s Brigade, fully con
firms this ; and Honorable Thomas R. Roulac, 49th North Carolina, says
that when the angle was carried, his troops had been attacked from the
north and west, as well as on their proper front; and this by troops he saw
moving down on them from the north, and that it was a “ hand to hand”
fight, “ with clubbed muskets.” See also North Carolina Regiments ;
1861-65 ; Vol. Ill, p. 143.
3 Ayres says Chamberlain’s troops at the angle were somewhat in advance
of his at the critical moment. Warren Court Records, p. 267 and p. 1080.

4

Testimony, Records Warren Court, p. 123.
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But in truth the fight was by no means over when the angle
was carried. Although tactically the result was a foregone con
clusion when this was done, and although the fighting there was
for a few minutes sharp, yet the hard fighting was in the whole
field where the enemy made their successive stands with such
courage and desperation. Griffin’s part in this, and even Craw
ford’s, cannot be ignored.
But it is insisted that Crawford’s Division marched out of the
fight. What is true is that it did not swing in promptly on
Ayres’s when he changed front to the left. That was an error,
and an inexcusable departure from positive orders, not being war
ranted by the developments of the battle. But something is to
be said about its cause, and its practical results. The diagram
indicated to Crawford that his division would strike the enemy
first at the “angle.” Encountering serious resistance on cross
ing the White Oak Road, and naturally drawn towards it, he
kept on, expecting perhaps that he was shortly to encounter the
main force of the enemy in their works, and not observing the
more severe attack which fell on Ayres’s left,— where, indeed,
the general orders for the battle should have prepared him to
understand it, and take accordant action. In such case, Griffin
would have taken in hand what was opposing Crawford. But
the enemy before him led him to a wider sweep, in the course
of which he confronted not only the two thousand dismounted
cavalry, but at length large bodies of the infantry broken from
their first hold and trying to make a stand on the Ford Road.
He had fighting all the way around. Calling our fight at the
angle, on our extreme left, “the front,” and saying that General
Warren was not “in the fight,” while it might be pardoned as
an excited ejaculation in the heat of battle, will not stand as
sober truth, or as the premise for so violent a conclusion. And
all those people who ring changes on the “ obliquing off” of
Crawford and Griffin from the center of action; “ marching
away from the fighting,” or “drifting out of” what they call
(by a familiar figure of speech) “ the fight,” do not tell us that
this appearance was because Ayres was suddenly compelled to
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make a square change of front, and those who did not instantly
conform and follow might seem to be obliquing to the right,
when in fact they were “ swinging to the left ” according to
orders,— unfortunately by too wide a sweep, having a very
active enemy in their front.
In this concern, some minds were
unduly affected by that very natural notion that the fight is
where they are; although in the case of General Sheridan it
must be admitted that “ the point was well taken.” Crawford’s
wide movement was undoubtedly an error, and a costly one for
Warren; but the simple fact that Crawford lost more men in
the battle than both the other divisions together,— more indeed
than all the rest, cavalry and infantry together,— goes to show
that some of the fight was where he was.
These accusations against the conduct of each of Warren’s
divisions, while susceptible of being magnified and manipulated
so as to produce a certain forensic effect, are of no substantial
weight. Even if true in the sharpest sense, they would be over
strained and uncalled for considering how the battle ended, and
by whom it was mainly fought.
The broad ground of reason,— and a valid one if substantiated
by fact,— for dissatisfaction with General Warren’s conduct in
the battle, and for his removal from command in consequence,
would be that he was not in proper position during the battle to
command his whole corps, and did not effectually command it.
That at a sharp and critical point he was not present where
General Sheridan wanted him is another matter, which does not
in itself support the former conclusion.
In a military and highly proper sense, General Warren was
responsible for the conduct of his corps, and ultimately for that
of each of his divisions. There are two ways in which such con
trol might be exercised : by prevention, or by correction. It was
Crawford’s duty to keep his vital connection with Ayres, and, if
in any way it should be broken, to be on the alert to see and to
act. Warren should hold him responsible for that. And if he
could not at the start rouse Crawford, whose peculiarities he
knew, to a vivid conception of the anatomy and physiology of
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the case, he should have had a staff officer charged with the
duty of keeping Crawford closed on Ayres, while he himself at
the point where he could keep in touch with his whole corps
should hold Griffin under his hand as the ready and trusted
reserve prepared for the unexpected.
It may be questioned, perhaps, whether it was wise to give
Crawford that front line and wheeling flank in a movement of
such importance, and make him a guide for Griffin. It would
have been better, (as Griffin and Ayres said later in the day),
to put Griffin on Ayres’s right, in the order in which, curiously
enough, Griffin’s brigades put themselves as if by some spiritual
attraction, or possibly only common sense.
But it may be justly said that, whatever errors the development
of the battle disclosed, Warren should have made his troops con
form to the state of facts. He did. We can well understand
how exasperating it must have been to General Sheridan when
Ayres was so suddenly, and it seems unexpectedly, struck on the
left flank, to find the largest division of the corps not turning
with him, but drawing away from the tactical focus and the close
envelopment of it intended, and getting into the place on the
wheeling flank which was assigned to Mackenzie’s cavalry, and
crowding Mackenzie “ out of the fight.” Griffin, when the
exigencies on the left disclosed this error, hastened to put in his
rear brigade,— the nearest — now become the leading one.
Warren with the same intent, passing him, pushed on for Craw
ford with feverish effort not short of agony. Indeed he did
more than could be legally required. He performed acts of
“supererogation,”—voluntary works and above the command
ments,— which certainly should have saved him from perdition.
He undertook the duties of staff-officer for Crawford. He got
hold of Kellogg’s Brigade and posted it as a “marker” in the
midst of the Sydnor woods, while he went off to find the rest of
Crawford, and make him execute the grand left wheel; when
one of Sheridan’s staff coming along, astonished at this dumbshow, a brigade stationary, “ marking time ” at such a crisis,
orders the marker into the “fight;” which the gallant
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commander begins right there, but ends soon after with a
more exacting antagonist and with equal glory.
Meantime finding Crawford disporting himself on the tangent
of a two-mile curve, Warren stuck to him like a tutor, leading
him in on a quick radius to the supposed center,— which, be it
borne in mind, we were all the time shifting off to the westward,
making his route exhibit all the marvels of the hyperbola. His
guide had gone into the vortex, and all he could do, in coming
back with Crawford’s recovered men, was to follow the fire,
which we were battering off to the Forks. The cyclone had
become a cycloid. So that Crawford was constantly obstructed
by fugitives from the fight crowding him worse and worse all
the way around; and when at last he struck the enemy’s works,
it was by no fault of Warren’s that he struck them at their
western end, near the Gilliam field, instead of at the left and
center through the Sydnor fields. Things being as they were,
Warren got his corps into the “ fight ” as quickly and effectively
as he or anybody else possibly could.
But it is charged that the failure to close quickly on Ayres
imperiled the result of the whole battle.1 Recalling the fact
that Griffin did not fail to close very promptly on Ayres, strik
ing the “return ” before Ayres struck the “angle,” and the fact
that the battle went on in the general way intended, only by a
wider sweep and more complete envelopment, we should give
attention to this remark, made in a manner so forcible. General
Sheridan’s judgment as a tactician can hardly be questioned ;
nor can his deliberate statement of it. But as we are now on
the line of hypothesis, we may be entitled to consider what
would have been the result in case Ayres had been withstood,
or even repulsed, in his first attack. In the assertion before us,
no account is made of Griffin’s troops. Is it assumed that they
were a flock of stray sheep, engaged in backing out of fire ?
i General Sheridan says : “If Ayres had been defeated, Crawford would
have been captured: the battle would have been lost.” Testimony, Warren
Court, Records, p. 125.
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What they would do may be judged from what they did. And
can any one suppose the enemy would consider themselves in a
very triumphant position between three bodies of our troops : —
Ayres in front; the cavalry in rear; and two divisions of the
Fifth Corps on their left flank as they would then front ? How
long does any one believe it would be, at such a signal, before
the whole Fifth Corps and our cavalry also would whirl in, and
catch the enemy in a maelstrom of destruction ? What did
happen, as it was, would have happened quicker had Ayres fared
harder.
Or suppose Ayres was not so fortunately struck from the
extended out-work, and had marched past the left of the enemy’s
entrenched line two hundred and fifty yards away, as he says he
was doing.1 Being on Griffin’s left, he must have struck the
left flank of the “ return,” and soon the rear of the enemy’s
main line on the White Oak Road. Griffin would then have
been in immediate connection and would have swung with him.
It would have taken a little longer; but the enemy would have
been enveloped all the same. Sheridan’s brilliant tactics would
have been triumphant. Only Warren would have shared the
glory.
Another consideration. Take things exactly as they were
said to be,— Ayres at the “angle ; ” Griffin and Crawford out.
What if those three Confederate brigades, ordered out of the
Claiborne entrenchments that afternoon to fall on the flank of
the Fifth Corps attacking at Five Forks, had come straight
down, and not gone a long roundabout way as they did, striking
too late and too far away for any good or harm,— what would
have been the effect in such case had not these two divisions of
the Fifth Corps been out there to stop them ?
But suppose, again, all had gone as ordered and intended, and
Crawford and Griffin had swung in on the rear of the lines on

^Testimony Warren Court Records, p. 255. Major Benyaurd, Corps of
Engineers, says Ayres’s left passed the “Bass” house to our right of it.
Warren Court Records, p. 160.

44

FIVE FORKS.

the White Oak Road. Would it not have been awkward to
have these five thousand fresh men2 come down on the backs of
our infantry, while having its hands full in front ? What could
Mackenzie have done with these men and Fitzhugh Lee’s cav
alry together ? Lucky was it for us, in either case, that these
five thousand infantrymen did not get down there. Lucky
would it have been in such case, that Crawford and Griffin
should happen to be out as flankers.
So much for the tactics of that battle. In spite of errors it
was a great victory. It was Sheridan’s battle. The glory of it
is his. With his cavalry there was no error nor failure. Their
action was not less than magnificent; the central thought car
ried into every brilliant act; — a picture to satisfy any point of
view, idealist or impressionist.
As to the strategic merits of the battle, a few reflections may
be permitted. Undoubtedly, as things were, it was an important
battle. But our isolated position there invited fresh attack;
and we only escaped it by the blundering or over-cautious course
of the forces sent out by Lee from the Claiborne front that
afternoon, and which in Sheridan’s solicitude we were pushed
out to meet that night. Then, too, we were much further off
from the Petersburg front, and the opportunity for concerted
action with the other corps in the line for general assault. And
finally, we were in no more advantageous position now than we
should be if we had turned the Claiborne flank of the enemy’s
entrenchments, and cut the Southside Road at Sutherland’s the
day before.1 Indeed, the very first thing we did the next morn
ing after Five Forks was to move back to turn this same fl uk
on the Claiborne Road and gain possession of Sutherland’s, nui
Miles had taken care of this, as we might have done before him.
Only Lee had now got a day’s start of us ; the head of his col
umn well out on its retreat, necessitated not by Five Forks
2 General Hunton, before the Warren Court, placed the numbers of these
three brigades, when they attacked us the day before, first at seven thousand
five hundred, but was induced by the effect of cross examination afterwards
to reduce this to five thousand. Records, pp. 629 and 630.
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alone but by gallant work along our whole confronting line,—
which might have been done the day before, and saved the long
task of racing day and night, of toils and tribulations and losses
recorded and unrecorded, which brought fame to Appomattox,
and the end of deeds rewarded and unrewarded.
A study of this battle shows vexing provocations, but does not
show satisfactory reasons for the removal of General Warren
from command of the Fifth Corps. The fact is that much of
the dissatisfaction with him was of longer standing. We recall
the incident that General Sheridan did not wish to have the Fifth
Corps with him at the start / also the suggestion by General
Grant that Sheridan might have occasion to remove him, and the
authority to do so ;2 then the keen disappointments of the
Dinwiddie overture the day before, and the exasperation at
Warren’s not reporting to Sheridan that night.3 We recall
General Griffin’s remark in the morning that something like this
would happen before the day was through/ We recur also to
the complaints earlier noticed.5 There was an unfavorable judg
ment of Warren’s manner of handling a corps ; an uncomfortable
sense of certain intellectual peculiarities of his ; a dislike of his
self-centered manner and temperament and habit generally, and
his rather injudicious way of expressing his opinion on tender
topics. There was a variety of antagonism towards General
Warren stored up and accumulating in General Sheridan’s mind,
and the tension of a heated moment brought the catastrophe.
No one can doubt General Sheridan’s “right” to remove
Warren; but whether he was right in doing so is another ques
tion, and one involving many elements. It is necessary that a
x The right of the enemy’s entrenchments on the Claiborne Road after
they were driven in on the afternoon of March 31, was by no means strongly
held. Testimony of General Hunton, Warren Court Records, p. 629.
1 See paper on the White Oak Road, Vol. I., of this series, p. 230.
2 Idem, p. 246.
3 Idem, p. 244-45.
4 Ante, p. 4.
5 Ante, p. 5, note.
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chief commander, who is under grave responsibilities, should have
the power to control and even displace the subordinates on whom
he depends for the execution of his plans. Nor is it to be
expected that he can properly be held to give strict account of
action so taken, or be called upon to analyze his motives and
justify himself by reasons to be passed upon by others. In this
case, there are many subjective reasons,— influences acting on
the mind of General Sheridan himself and not easily made known
to others,— impressions from accounts of previous action, the
appearance of things at the moment, and his state of mind in
consequence,— which go to strengthen the favorable presump
tion accorded to his act. But as to the essential equity of it,
the moral justification of it, opinions will be governed by knowl
edge of facts, and these extending beyond the incidents or
accidents of this field.
The simple transfer of a corps commander is not a disgrace,
nor necessarily an injury. General Warren had no vested right
to the command of the Fifth Corps. And if Sheridan expected
to have this corps with him in this campaign, in which he held
assurances of a conspicuous and perhaps pre-eminent part, and
General Warren was to him a persona non grata, we cannot
wonder that he should wish to remove him. He had already
objected to having this corps with him ; but after trial he did
not send back the corps, but its commander. It was the time,
place and manner of this removal, the implications involved in it,
and the vague reasons given for it, which made the grievance for
General Warren. He was immediately assigned to another
command ; but even if Grant had restored him to the Fifth
Corps, this would not wipe out that record, which stood against
his honor. It is highly probable that a court martial would not
have found him guilty of misconduct warranting such a punish
ment as dismissal from his command. There was not then, as
there is not now, any tribunal with power to change the conclu
sion so summarily given by Sheridan, or to annul or mitigate
the material effects of it. But such reasons as were given for
this affected Warren’s honor, and hence he persistently invoked
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a court of inquiry. All that he could hope for from such a
court was the opportunity thus given for the facts and measura
bly the motives and feelings affecting the case to be brought
out and placed upon the public records.
The posture of the parties before that court was peculiar.
The members of the court were general officers of the active
army. The applicant was then a lieutentant-colonel of engi
neers. The respondent —virtually the defendant — was lieuten
ant-general of the armies of the United States,— the superior
of course, and the commander, of every member of the court,
as also of most of the witnesses before it, then in the military
service. The “ next friend ” and chief witness,— called by the
applicant, but necessarily for the respondent,— was General
Grant, ex-president of the United States, who still carried an
immense prestige and influence. The traditions of the whole
War Department were for sustaining military authority. We
could not expect this court to bring in a verdict of censure on
General Sheridan, or anything that would amount to that. We
can only wonder at the courage of all who gave Warren any
favorable endorsement or explanation, and especially of the court
which found so little to censure in the conduct of General War
ren as commander of the Fifth Corps in those last three days.
The court sustained General Sheridan in his right, but General
Warren felt that the revelation of the facts was of the nature of
vindication. It came too late to save much of his life ; it may
have saved what was dearer.
I am by no means sure but that injustice must be taken by a
military officer as a necessary part of his risks, of the conditions
and chances of his service, to be suffered in the same way as
wounds and sicknesses, in patience and humility. But when one
feels that his honor and the truth itself are impugned, then that
larger personality is concerned wherein one belongs to others
and his worth is somehow theirs. Then he does not satisfy
himself with regret,— that strange complex feeling that some
thing is right which is now impossible,— and even the truth
made known becomes a consolation.
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The Fifth Corps had an eventful history. Two passages of it
made a remarkable coincidence. It was its fortune to lose two of
its commanders,— the first and the last in the field of action,—
by measures so questionable as to call for a court of review, by
which, long after, both were substantially vindicated : Fitz John
Porter, accounted the most accomplished corps commander on
the Peninsula, and “heir apparent” to the command of the
army, and Warren, whom Grant says he had looked upon for
commander of the army in case anything should take from the
field the sterling Meade. Who from such beginning could have
foretold the end! And Meade,— he, too, went from the Fifth
Corps to the command of the army, and found there a troubled
eminence and an uncrowned end.
Shakespeare tells us, poetizing fate or faith :
“ There’s a Divinity that shapes our ends,
Rough-hew them how we will.”

To our common eyes it often seems a dark divinity that rules ;
and the schoolmaster might interchange the verbs.
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